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Mandatory Arbitration and Inequality of Justice in Employment
Abstract
[Excerpt] In this Paper, I will examine the operation of mandatory arbitration as an employment dispute
resolution system to investigate the degree to which it increases or decreases equality of access to justice in
employment relations. To address this question, I will use a model of individual employment relations that
encompasses four key components.
The first component is the structure of rights held by employees. This includes the substantive employment
rights provided by federal or state law. It also includes the institutional structure of procedures for
enforcement of these rights, such as the incidence and structure of mandatory arbitration procedures.
The second component is the sources of power available to employees. In the traditional labor relations realm,
union collective bargaining and strike power provided employees with a source of countervailing power
against employers. In the individual rights realm, the threat of litigation serves a similar role as a major source
of employee power checking the workplace power and authority of employers. A key question regarding
mandatory arbitration is to what degree it enhances or diminishes this source of employee power.
The third component is the mechanism of employee representation. To effectively articulate and enforce
individual employee rights, a well functioning mechanism for providing representation to employees is
critical. The key question here for mandatory arbitration is how it affects the availability of representation by
plaintiff-side employment attorneys who provide the primary mechanism of representation in the individual
employment rights litigation system.
The fourth component of the model is the pattern of employment relations in the workplace. An effective
individual employment rights system does not operate in a vacuum, but rather functions by altering
employment relations behaviors in the workplace. Put alternatively, beyond providing remedies for violations
of individual rights, the system should also exert a deterrent effect that encourages organizations to uphold
these rights in the first place. Regarding mandatory arbitration, the question is whether or not it produces
employment relation patterns in the workplace that better protect individual employment rights.
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INTRODUCTION
Economic inequality is a central challenge of our time. Much attention
has rightly been given to the growth in income and wealth inequality in the
United States, reaching levels not seen since the 1920s.' This rise in
economic inequality has occurred in conjunction with a shift in the
governance of the workplace with a decline in union representation to only
12.5% of the workforce in 2012.2 Declining unionization is itself one of the
factors leading to greater wage inequality' and a diminished political voice
t Martin F. Scheinman Professor, ILR School, Cornell University. The survey research project
that led to some of the results reported in this paper was supported by a research grant to Cornell
University from the Robert L. Habush Endowment of the American Association for Justice. I also
gratefully acknowledge the contributions of the National Employment Lawyers Association (NELA) in
providing access to its membership for the conduct of the survey and to its individual member attorneys
who responded to the survey for their time and efforts in doing so. All claims, opinions, and errors in
this paper are my own and do not represent those of the organizations that provided assistance for this
research project.
1. Thomas Piketty & Emmanuel Saez, Income Inequality in the United States, 1913-1998, 118
Q.J. ECON 1, 35 (2003).
2. Press Release, Bureau of Labor Statistics, Union Members-2012 (Jan. 23, 2013).
3. See David Card, The Effect of Unions on Wage Inequality in the US. Labor Market, 54 IND.
& LAB. REL. REv. 296 (2001) (finding through labor economic research that unions exert an equalizing
effect on income by reducing the dispersion of wages).
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for workers.4 However it also has resulted in reduced access to justice in the
workplace as fewer employees are now covered by the just cause provisions
and strong grievance procedures traditionally provided by union negotiated
collective bargaining agreements.'
In contrast to the growing concerns over income inequality, much less
attention has been paid to the question of equality of justice in employment.
By equality of justice in employment, I refer to equality in the ability of
employees to have access to due process in regard to employment decisions
affecting them and the ability to challenge adverse decisions. With the
decline in union representation, the provision of justice in the workplace is
increasingly dependent on individual employment rights enacted through
statutes. Substantive individual employment rights have expanded, albeit
slowly, over recent decades.6 The number of individual rights claims made
through government agencies and the courts increased over the same period
that union representation and strike rates declined.' This expansion of
individual employment rights provides a new basis for employees to
achieve fairness in workplace decisions affecting them, supporting greater
equality of justice in employment. Yet against this trend are countervailing
forces pushing toward greater inequality in justice in the workplace. In
particular, this article will examine the question of how the expansion of
mandatory arbitration of individual employment rights affects equality of
justice in the workplace.
Alternative dispute resolution ("ADR") procedures are often held out
as having the potential to enhance equality of access to justice for
employees.' By providing a balance between the interests of efficiency,
equity, and participant voice, well-designed ADR procedures hold the
promise of avoiding the pathologies of the litigation system, where cost and
inefficiency can create genuine barriers to many employees bringing claims,
and instead providing a greater range of employees with accessible
4. Frank Levy and Peter Temin emphasize the broader institutional and political role of unions
and see their declining influence as a major factor increasing general economic inequality. Frank Levy
& Peter Temin, Inequality and Institutions in 2 0th Century America (MIT Dep't of Econs., Working
Paper No. 07-17, 2007).
5. For discussions of the declining impact of union collective bargaining agreements and the
resulting more limited coverage of the grievance and arbitration procedures found in unionized
workplaces, see, for example, Michael J. Piore & Sean Safford, Changing Regimes of Workplace
Governance, Shifting Axes of Social Mobilization, and the Challenge to Industrial Relations Theory, 45
INDUS. REL. 299 (2006); Alexander J.S. Colvin, American Workplace Dispute Resolution in the
Individual Rights Era, 23 INT'L J. HUM. RESOURCE MGMT. 459 (2012).
6. See Piore & Safford, supra note 5; Colvin, American Workplace, supra note 5.
7. See Piore & Safford, supra note 5; Colvin, American Workplace, supra note 5.
8. Samuel Estreicher, Saturns for Rickshaws: The Stakes in the Debate over Pre-Dispute
Employment Arbitration Agreements, 16 OHIO ST. J. ON DiSP. RESOL. 559, 561 (2001).
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procedures.' However, it is important to recognize that ADR is not a
generic category of procedures with identical or even similar effects on the
processing of individual rights claims. Rather, the impact of ADR
procedures on the process and outcomes of dispute resolution depends
strongly on the institutional design and functioning of the procedures. When
we examine a particular type of ADR procedure like mandatory arbitration,
it is important to consider how the structure of the procedure affects the
incentives and behaviors of the parties and the outcomes of the dispute
resolution process.
In this Paper, I will examine the operation of mandatory arbitration as
an employment dispute resolution system to investigate the degree to which
it increases or decreases equality of access to justice in employment
relations. To address this question, I will use a model of individual
employment relations that encompasses four key components.
The first component is the structure of rights held by employees. This
includes the substantive employment rights provided by federal or state law.
It also includes the institutional structure of procedures for enforcement of
these rights, such as the incidence and structure of mandatory arbitration
procedures.
The second component is the sources of power available to employees.
In the traditional labor relations realm, union collective bargaining and
strike power provided employees with a source of countervailing power
against employers. In the individual rights realm, the threat of litigation
serves a similar role as a major source of employee power checking the
workplace power and authority of employers. A key question regarding
mandatory arbitration is to what degree it enhances or diminishes this
source of employee power.
The third component is the mechanism of employee representation. To
effectively articulate and enforce individual employee rights, a well-
functioning mechanism for providing representation to employees is
critical. The key question here for mandatory arbitration is how it affects
the availability of representation by plaintiff-side employment attorneys
who provide the primary mechanism of representation in the individual
employment rights litigation system.
The fourth component of the model is the pattern of employment
relations in the workplace. An effective individual employment rights
system does not operate in a vacuum, but rather functions by altering
employment relations behaviors in the workplace. Put alternatively, beyond
providing remedies for violations of individual rights, the system should
also exert a deterrent effect that encourages organizations to uphold these
9. John W. Budd & Alexander J.S. Colvin, Improved Metrics for Workplace Dispute Resolution
Procedures: Efficiency, Equity, and Voice, 47 INDUS. REL. 460 (2008).
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rights in the first place. Regarding mandatory arbitration, the question is
whether or not it produces employment relation patterns in the workplace
that better protect individual employment rights.
These four components of the employment relations system interact to
determine its effectiveness in protecting individual rights in the workplace.
In the following Parts, I examine each of these components of the
individual employment rights system in turn, using them to analyze the
degree to which mandatory arbitration is enhancing or diminishing equality
of access to justice in the workplace.
I.
THE STRUCTURE OF RIGHTS
When the Supreme Court first gave its imprimatur to the use of
arbitration to resolve statutory employment rights in Gilmer v.
Interstate/Johnson Laneo, it stated explicitly that the decision did not
represent an alteration of the substantive rights protecting employees.
Quoting its earlier decision from Mitsubishi Motors v. Soler Chrysler-
Plymouth, Inc., the majority commented that: "[b]y agreeing to arbitrate a
statutory claim, a party does not forgo the substantive rights afforded by the
statute; it only submits to their resolution in an arbitral, rather than a
judicial, forum."" Through the subsequent debates and judicial decisions
around mandatory arbitration, this idea that the same substantive rights are
to be applied in arbitration and in the courts has generally stayed constant.
Instead, the debates have focused more on the question of whether, in
applying these substantive rights, the decision-making of employment
arbitrators differs from that of the courts, an issue to which I will return in
the next Part.
Whereas the Supreme Court in Gilmer stated that arbitration did not
modify the substantive rights of employees, it was equally clear in its
decision that arbitration altered the structure of procedural rights by
providing for an alternative forum for the resolution of claims. Indeed, an
important policy justification given by the majority for enforcing
agreements to arbitrate statutory claims was that, in arbitration, a party
"trades the procedures and opportunities for review of the courtroom for the
simplicity, expedition, and informality of arbitration." 2 We see this
procedural contrast between litigation and arbitration in such features as
more limited discovery, less frequent use of summary judgment motions,
and less stringent application of the rules of evidence. Indeed, a central
10. 500 U.S. 20, 26 (1991).
ii. Id (citing Mitsubishi Motors v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 628 (1985)).
12. Id. at 31 (quoting Mitsubishi Motors, 473 U.S. at 628).
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characteristic of arbitration is that it provides less formal procedures than
litigation.
In these and other respects, mandatory arbitration can be contrasted
with litigation in terms of the structure of procedural rights. But mandatory
arbitration also represents a structure of procedural rights different from
other types of arbitration. Furthermore, there is substantial variation in
procedures and structure within the landscape of mandatory arbitration
itself.
As mandatory arbitration initially developed in the 1990s, a natural
comparison was to the long-standing, well-established system of labor
arbitration used in unionized workplaces. Labor arbitration has some
similarities to mandatory arbitration in regard to its relative informality and
speed of adjudication compared to the litigation system. Some labor
arbitrators also serve as employment arbitrators. However, the institutional
structures of these two types of arbitration differ substantially. Labor
arbitration is the product of joint negotiation by the two parties to collective
bargaining, whereas mandatory arbitration is implemented at the unilateral
initiative of management. Further, the jointly negotiated provisions of the
labor contract are the source of substantive rules in labor arbitration. The
union also provides an institutionalized mechanism of representation in
labor arbitration.
In many respects, the use of arbitration in individually negotiated
employment contracts is a closer parallel to mandatory arbitration.
Typically negotiated by executive-level or other highly compensated
employees, many individual employment contracts contain arbitration
clauses. Although similar to mandatory arbitration in their focus on
individual employment relationships and disputes, these arbitration
agreements are different in origin in that they are jointly negotiated and
particular to the individual employment relationship, rather than applied to
a group of employees.
Although less common than mandatory arbitration, individually
negotiated arbitration is a widespread and distinctive dispute resolution
system. In a study of all employment arbitration cases administered by the
American Arbitration Association ("AAA") in 2008, Kelly Pike and I found
that 124 of the 449 cases (27.6%) in our sample involved individually
negotiated arbitration agreements, as opposed to the employer promulgated,
mandatory arbitration procedures involved in the other 325 cases." The
individually negotiated arbitration cases were distinctive in featuring better-
paid employees, more contractual than statutory claims, and a higher
likelihood of attorney representation of the employee. Employees bringing
13. Alexander J.S. Colvin & Kelly Pike, Saturns and Rickshaws Revisited: What Kind of
Employment Arbitration System has Developed?, 29 OHIO ST. J. ON DIsP. RESOL. 59,65 (2014).
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claims through individually negotiated procedures also had much higher
win rates (64.6%) and received relatively high average damages ($220,736).
Overall, these differences between mandatory and individually
negotiated arbitration indicate a very different and more advantageous
system of individual rights dispute resolution for those employees who have
the bargaining power to individually negotiate their employment contracts
and arbitration agreements. From an inequality of access to justice
perspective, this comparison represents one way in which inequality in the
process of individual employment rights dispute resolution tracks the
general income inequality in society.
The comparison to individually negotiated arbitration is also
informative when considering which employees are covered by mandatory
arbitration. Whereas individually negotiated arbitration arises by joint
negotiation between the employer and the employee, the defining
characteristic of mandatory arbitration is that it is the product of unilateral
promulgation of the procedure by the employer as a term and condition of
employment. As a result, the incidence of mandatory arbitration is not the
product of calculation of desirability by the individual employee. Nor is it a
product of general public enactment of a dispute resolution system to be
available to all employees. Rather, whether any given employee must bring
individual rights claims through a mandatory arbitration procedure depends
on the decision of his or her employer to adopt the procedure for its
employees.
If one views mandatory arbitration as a positive alternative to
litigation, then this should suggest an overly-limited incidence of
mandatory arbitration, as many employees would be denied its benefits due
to the failure of their employers to adopt it. Conversely, if one views
mandatory arbitration as an inadequate alternative to litigation, then many
employees are denied the benefits of the public courts based on the
particular, individual decisions of their employers. Whichever view one
holds of mandatory arbitration, the resulting patchwork adoption of
mandatory arbitration depending on the decisions of individual employers is
producing a substantial degree of difference in the procedures available for
resolving individual employment rights disputes.
Even amongst employers who have adopted mandatory arbitration,
there is substantial variation in the structure of procedures. In designing the
mandatory arbitration agreement, the employer chooses which, if any,
arbitration service provider will administer the arbitration and the rules
under which the arbitration will be conducted. Some arbitration service
providers-notably the AAA which is currently the largest provider of
employment arbitration services-have agreed to abide by certain due
process protections in their procedures, including those set out in the Due
Vol. 35
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Process Protocol.14 The AAA will decline to administer mandatory
arbitrations that are not based on its standard rules, which among other
provisions require that the employer pay the arbitrator fees and
administrative costs apart from a small filing fee. From the plaintiffs
perspective, it is advantageous to have mandatory arbitration administered
by an arbitration service provider with a standard set of rules that can serve
as a basis for due process protections.
However, an employer need not designate any service provider to
administer arbitration, nor need they adopt any standard set of rules and
procedures for the conduct of arbitration. In a survey of attorneys that
represent plaintiff employees conducted by Mark Gough and myself, we
found that the second most common category of arbitration administration
after administration by the AAA was ad hoc cases, i.e. cases in which there
was no service provider at all." In ad hoc arbitration, the employer can use
control over the design of the mandatory arbitration procedure to establish
procedures that best serve its own interests. In extreme cases, the courts
have stepped in to hold some agreements unenforceable on the grounds of
unconscionability, where the procedures were so lacking in due process as
to be impermissibly one-sided.'6 But to date, only a small number of cases
have held arbitration agreements unenforceable on due process grounds.
Our results indicate that these cases have not deterred a significant number
of employers from using ad hoc arbitration in place of using an established
service provider.
The most recent illustration of how mandatory arbitration can change
the structure of procedures comes from the Supreme Court's decision in
AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion," which enforced an arbitration
agreement that barred class actions and required all claims to be brought
individually before an arbitrator. There was some initial question of
whether that decision extended to mandatory arbitration in employment
cases, and particularly, whether it conflicted with the National Labor
Relations Act's section 7 protections for concerted activity. However, with
the Fifth Circuit's recent reversal of the NLRB's D.R. Horton decision, it
appears clear that the ability of mandatory arbitration provisions to bar class
actions holds in employment cases." This further illustrates how the
structure of rules for enforcing employment rights now depends on the
employer's decision whether to require mandatory arbitration.
14. Richard A. Bales, The Employment Due Process Protocol at Ten: Twenty Unresolved Issues,
anda Focus on Conflicts ofInterest, 21 OHIO ST. J. ON Disp. RESOL. 165, 174 (2005).
15. See Mark Gough, The High Costs of an Inexpensive Forum: An Empirical Analysis of
Employment Discrimination Claims Heard in Arbitration and Civil Litigation, 35 BERKELEY J. EMP. &
LAB L. 91 (2014).
16. E.g., Hooters of Am., Inc. v. Phillips, 173 F.3d 933, 941 (4th Cir. 1999).
17. 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1753 (2011).
18. D.R. Horton, Inc. v. NLRB, 737 F.3d 344, 364 (5th Cir. 2013).
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The picture that emerges overall is one in which the structure of rules
for enforcement of individual employment rights does not parallel the
general coverage of substantive rights found in the relevant statutes. Rather,
the procedures used for enforcing these rights are the product of the
calculations and decisions of individual employers as to how they wish to
resolve conflict with their employees. Employees only participate in this
decision if they possess unusually high levels of individual bargaining
power, as do executive-level managers, or if they hold collective bargaining
power through union representation. The result of this power imbalance is
inequality between employees in the structure of their procedural rights for
the enforcement of substantive employment rights.
II.
SOURCES OF POWER
Labor relations theory and policy have been concerned historically
about issues of relative bargaining power between employers and
employees. A number of factors tend to result in employees having
relatively less bargaining power than employers. Whereas any individual
employee represents only a small part of the labor force of a large
employer, that employee's job usually represents the major source of
income and economic security for the employee. As a result, the impact on
the employee of losing that job is vastly greater than the impact on the
employer of losing any individual employee. Individual employees also
have greater personal investment in their current jobs and the specific skills
they have developed, rendering mobility more costly.
The New Deal system of labor relations sought to address this
inequality of bargaining power between employers and employees through
establishing the terms and conditions of employment through collective
bargaining. Where an individual employee lacks bargaining power, a
collective group of employees could exert sufficient bargaining power to
balance that of the employer. This bargaining power was premised on the
ability of the unionized group of workers to use the economic weapon of
the strike. By withholding its collective labor, the strike allows the union to
put sufficient economic pressure on the employer to obtain favorable
compromises at the bargaining table.
In the present era, where relatively few workers have access to union
representation and collective bargaining, individual employment rights have
become the new source of bargaining power for employees. While we often
think of employment statutes as establishing a set of rules that determine
what is or is not permissible in employment relations, translating the rights
provided in these statutes into practices in the workplace involves a process
of contested decision-making and negotiated implementation. For example,
employers may not satisfy the legal requirement that employees cannot be
Vol. 35
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terminated because of age by simply deciding not to terminate employees
based on age. Rather, the employer may need to take additional steps to
prevent age-based discrimination. In a complex modem organization, where
multiple actors may be involved in employment decisions, who will ensure
that termination decisions are not based on age? What documentation will
the organization require in termination decisions to ensure they are not age
based? Will there be training of managers on discrimination issues?
Suppose an employee alleges that he or she is being terminated based on
age-how will the organization respond? Will there be some type of
internal complaint procedure? Should the organization make a practice of
offering some type of severance payment with a release of potential
liability?
How the organization answers these questions will depend in
significant measure on the potential legal consequences for violating
employee rights. There may be direct financial consequences if there is a
legal judgment against the employer. Whatever the outcome of any
proceedings, there are likely to be substantial legal costs in defending
against a claim. The time and attention of the organization's management
may be consumed by the process of litigation, particularly because of
discovery requirements and potential for depositions. In addition to being
costly, litigation also brings uncertainty. The employer will have to
consider the chances of success or failure in litigation and the incentives for
settlement to avoid these risks. Litigation may be a low-frequency event,
but it is also one that is high-risk, with the potential for substantial costs if
the employer is unsuccessful.
These characteristics of the litigation process create a strong incentive
for employers to manage their employment relations in a manner that
reduces the potential for legal risks. Employers will treat employees more
favorably in employment relations than they otherwise might, out of a
concern to protect the organization's own interests in avoiding legal
pressures. In this way, litigation operates as a source of bargaining power
for employees in the individual rights era that parallels the role of strikes as
the source of bargaining power for employees in the collective bargaining
system of the New Deal era.
How does mandatory arbitration affect this source of employee power?
A basic starting point in answering this question is to look at how
mandatory arbitration compares to litigation in terms of case outcomes. A
number of authors have examined litigation outcomes. A 2003 study by
Professors Eisenberg and Hill reported employee win rates in employment
discrimination trials of 36.4%." The same study reported a higher employee
19. Theodore Eisenberg & Elizabeth Hill, Arbitration and Litigation of Employment Claims: An
Empirical Comparison, 58 DIsP. RESOL. J. 44 (2003).
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win rate of fifty-seven percent in a sample of state court, non-civil rights
based employment cases. This latter win rate is similar to the fifty-nine
percent employee win rate in California state court trials involving common
law discharge-based claims found in research by Professor David
Oppenheimer.20 By contrast, my own research on outcomes of mandatory
arbitration hearings found a 21.4% employee win rate amongst cases
administered by the AAA. 21 Around half of all mandatory arbitration cases
administered by the AAA involve employment discrimination claims, with
the majority of the remainder involving non-civil rights, common law-based
claims.22
Turning to damage amounts, we find similar differences in outcomes.
Eisenberg and Hill reported a median damage award of $150,500 in federal
court employment discrimination trials and a median damage award of
$68,737 in state court non-civil rights employment trials.23 Meanwhile,
Oppenheimer found a median damage award of $296,991 in California state
court common law discharge trials.24 By contrast, I found a median award
of $36,500 in mandatory arbitration cases administered by the AAA.25
An employer faced with the prospect of a dispute in either litigation or
arbitration will be concerned about both the likelihood that the employee
will prevail and the potential damages that will be awarded. Across a
number of potential cases that the employer may face, the combination of
the employee win rate and the potential damages provides an indicator of
the overall economic impact of resolving this set of cases. A useful measure
of this outcome is the average award amount calculated across all cases,
including those where the employee loses and those where no damages are
awarded. Looking at the results reported by Eisenberg and Hill, we find that
this mean outcome is $143,497 for federal court employment discrimination
trials and $328,008 for state court non-civil rights employment trials. 26 By
contrast, I find that for mandatory arbitration cases administered by the
AAA, the mean outcome across all awards is $23,548, approximately one-
seventh of the mean outcome in the federal court trials and one-fifteenth the
mean outcome in the state court trials. This much lower outcome reflects
20. David Benjamin Oppenheimer, Verdicts Matter: An Empirical Study of California
Employment Discrimination and Wrongful Discharge Jury Verdicts Reveals Low Success Rates for
Women and Minorities, 37 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 511, 535 (2003).
21. Alexander J.S. Colvin, An Empirical Study of Employment Arbitration: Case Outcomes and
Processes, 8 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 1 (2011).
22. Colvin & Pike, supra note 13, at 68.
23. Eisenberg & Hill, supra note 19, at 50.
24. Oppenheimer, supra note 20.
25. Colvin, Empirical Study, supra note 21, at 7.
26. See inflation adjusted results calculated in Colvin, Empirical Study, supra note 22, at 5, based
on the results reported in Eisenberg & Hill, supra, note 20.
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the combination of the lower employee win rate at arbitration hearings and
the smaller awards to employees in arbitration.
The figures presented so far are the raw, unadjusted outcomes of trials
and arbitration hearings. They do not reflect differences in the likelihood of
settling cases before trial, effects of summary judgments or appeals, or
selection effects on the types of cases employees bring. Before considering
these other factors further, however, it is worth observing the relatively
large differences in these raw outcomes. To the degree that employers are
motivated by the likelihood of a relatively large damage award in a trial,
this motivation will decrease with mandatory arbitration because those
damage awards, for whatever reason, are much smaller. This may, in turn,
significantly impact other resolution processes, particularly settlement,
which is the most common way cases are resolved in both litigation and
mandatory arbitration.2 7 If the mean damage award for cases proceeding to
a hearing in mandatory arbitration is much lower than the mean damage
award at trial, this will reduce employee bargaining power in settlement
negotiations and be likely to produce lower settlement amounts, because the
likely award, and thus the risk for employers, is not as great.
The raw comparisons do not take into account procedural differences
between litigation and mandatory arbitration. Employers may be more
likely in litigation to defeat claims on summary judgment or to overturn
unfavorable trial decisions on appeal. Research by Clermont and Schwab on
employment litigation in the federal courts showed that, compared to other
litigants, plaintiff employees tend to do relatively poorly in summary
judgment motions and in appeals.28 While summary judgment motions have
historically been less common in arbitration, Kelly Pike and I found in
recent research that they were used in one quarter of the mandatory
arbitration cases that we examined.29 Employers succeeding in winning
dismissal of the case in over half of these motions,30 suggesting that the
differences from litigation in this area are diminishing. Further evidence of
this trend comes from a survey of plaintiff employment attorneys that Mark
Gough and I conducted in 2013. We asked the respondents questions about
the most recent case that they had handled in arbitration that resulted in an
award. In fully fifty-four percent of the 148 cases that proceeded to
arbitration, a motion for summary judgment was filed.3
A broader source of potential differences in trial and arbitration
hearing outcomes is the possibility of selection effects in the types of cases
27. Id. at 17.
28. Kevin M. Clermont & Stewart J. Schwab, How Employment Discrimination Plaintiffs Fare in
Federal Court, I J. OF EMPIRICAL LEGAL STuD. 429, 429 (2004).
29. Colvin & Pike, supra note 13, at 72.
30. Id.
31. See Gough, supra note 15, at 108.
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that are brought through each forum. These selection effects arise on either
the employee or the employer side. On the employee side, there may be a
selection effect arising from the degree to which employees find mandatory
arbitration to be a more or less amenable forum for bringing claims as
compared to litigation. If mandatory arbitration is a relatively more
accessible forum, then more employees might bring cases through it, and
the overall pool of cases in arbitration might include cases with smaller
damage awards at stake and claims that are harder to prove.32 The relative
accessibility of mandatory arbitration will, however, depend on how it
affects the ability of employees to obtain and finance representation by
counsel, or to act pro se, which will be the focus of the next Part.
There also may be selection effects on the type of cases brought in
mandatory arbitration on the employer side. If mandatory arbitration is
introduced in combination with internal grievance procedures and other
preliminary ADR steps, then the cases that ultimately proceed to arbitration
may represent weaker, lower-value claims. I will return to examine this
possibility later in this Paper.
III.
MECHANISMS OF REPRESENTATION
For effective vindication of individual employment rights, there must
be a mechanism of representation for employees bringing claims. In the
litigation system, the plaintiffs' bar provides this basic function of expert
advice and representation, assisting employees in bringing claims under the
often complex structures of employment statutes. Certainly, the difficulties
associated with establishing claims of employment discrimination typically
require expert representation. But even seemingly straightforward claims
such as wage and hour law violations can often implicate more legally
complex issues, such as whether the claimant is in fact an employee or an
independent contractor. In addition, many individual wage and hour claims
are relatively small in size and so can only effectively be brought when
aggregated with other similar claims in a class action. Such a suit would
also require expert legal representation.
One of the hopes for mandatory arbitration was that it would increase
accessibility by providing a relatively simple forum where employees
would be able to bring claims effectively without representation. In
litigation, around one fifth of claims are brought pro se. However, pro se
claimants tend to have relatively low rates of success." Rates of pro se
32. Estreicher, supra note 8, at 563-64; see David Sherwyn, Samuel Estreicher, & Michael Heise,
Assessing the Casefor Employment Arbitration: A New Path for Empirical Research, 57 STANFORD. L.
REV. 1557, 1565-67 (2005).
33. Laura Beth Nielsen, Robert L. Nelson, & Ryon Lancaster, Individual Justice or Collective
Legal Mobilization? Employment Discrimination Litigation in the Post Civil Rights United States, 7 J.
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claims are higher in mandatory arbitration, but still represent only 24.9% of
all mandatory arbitration claims.34 These pro se claims in mandatory
arbitration tend to be smaller in size, and employees bringing them are less
likely to obtain a settlement. If they do proceed to a hearing, pro se
employees are also less likely to be successful than employees who are
represented. While self-representation is an interesting issue, the evidence
indicates that it only occurs in a minority of cases in mandatory arbitration.
As in litigation, representation by legal counsel is the predominant way in
which employees bring cases in mandatory arbitration. The key question,
then, is how mandatory arbitration affects the ability of employees to obtain
representation.
What do we know about who is representing employees in mandatory
arbitration? In a recent study I conducted with Kelly Pike, we collected data
on employee representation in 325 mandatory arbitration cases administered
by the AAA in 2008.35 We found that amongst the attorneys representing
employees in these cases, 56.7% included employment law as one of their
primary practice areas."6 The remainder typically were general litigation
practitioners that did not specialize in employment cases. By contrast,
76.6% of the employers' counsel in these same cases were primarily
employment law practitioners.37
The lower degree of employment law specialization on the employee
side suggests that employees may be receiving less expertise in
representation than their employer counterparts. Further reinforcing this
concern, in 54.6% of the cases we examined, the law firm representing the
employer was also handling one or more additional cases in our sample.
By contrast, amongst the law firms representing employees, only 10.7%
handled two or more cases in our sample.3 9 Not only are employers more
likely to be represented by employment law specialist counsel, they are
likely to be represented by firms with greater experience with mandatory
arbitration itself.
On the employee side, this data captures the wide variation in the
nature of representation in mandatory arbitration. According to the data, one
quarter of employees proceed pro se. Another third of employees are
represented by counsel, but by an attorney for whom employment law is not
OF EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 175, 188 (2010) (finding in a study of employment discrimination cases
filed in federal district courts that "[o]ne in five plaintiffs . . . operat[es] pro se over the course of the
lawsuit, and they are almost three times more likely to have their cases dismissed, are less likely to gain
early settlement, and are twice as likely to lose on summary judgment").
34. Colvin, Empirical Study, supra note 21, at 16.
35. Colvin & Pike, supra note 13, at 65.
36. Id. at 70.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Id.
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his primary practice. Fewer than half of employees at arbitration hearings
are represented by an attorney who specializes in employment law as a
primary practice area.40
What drives the ability of employees to obtain representation in these
cases? In employment litigation, the key mechanism is the availability of
contingency fee arrangements. For most employees, paying for
representation on an hourly-fee basis is beyond their financial means. This
is particularly the case given that most employment cases arise in the
context of termination, where the employee has just lost his or her primary
source of income.4 1 Under a contingency fee arrangement, the plaintiff
attorney takes on the financing of the case by assuming the risk of the
success or failure. There are obvious limitations to this mechanism. It
requires that a case provide a sufficient prospect of success and potentially
recoverable damages for the plaintiff attorney to make the investment in
handling the case. However, it also provides a self-financing mechanism for
bringing cases that extends representation to large numbers of employee
plaintiffs who would otherwise be unable to proceed with claims.
How does mandatory arbitration affect the ability of employees to
obtain representation through this mechanism? It is important to recognize
that plaintiff attorneys look across the full set of cases they handle to
consider the potential outcome of contingency fee arrangements. Since their
payment is a percentage of the damages where successful, and therefore
receive nothing if their advocacy is unsuccessful, they must consider the
likely average recovery across all cases. As a result, the key outcome to
consider for a contingency fee arrangement is the mean damages across all
cases, i.e. the overall outcomes examined in the previous Part. For a
plaintiff attorney contemplating contingency fee arrangements, the mean
damage outcome cited of $143,497 for federal court employment
discrimination trials and $328,008 for state court non-civil rights
employment trials would be the relevant amounts on which to calculate the
potential recovery. With these average economic outcomes, a contingency
arrangement of thirty percent or forty percent would provide a recovery
substantial enough (in the $50,000-$100,000 range) to justify attorney
financing of what could be a relatively long and complex employment case.
By contrast, when we consider the mean outcome of $23,548 for mandatory
arbitration cases, a similar contingency fee arrangement would only
produce a potential return of approximately $10,000, a much smaller sum
for the attorney. It might still be worthwhile for the attorney to take on the
case if the forum and the case were simpler than in litigation, but if the case
40. Id.
41. See Nielsen et al., supra note 33, at 200, who report that 60.5% of the employment cases they
analyzed involved firings
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required an investment of more than a few thousand dollars, it would no
longer be economically feasible for the plaintiff attorney to accept this case.
The danger is that relatively low win rates and damage amounts will
discourage plaintiff attorneys from taking on many cases under mandatory
arbitration procedures. As a result, we may see a negative selection effect in
which the lack of accessible representation results in fewer cases brought
where mandatory arbitration is required. To investigate whether mandatory
arbitration has a negative effect on the likelihood of attorney representation,
Mark Gough and I conducted a survey of employment attorneys who were
members of either the National Employment Lawyers Association or the
California Employers Association. Using the membership of these
associations as our survey populations allows us to focus on attorneys who
specialize in the representation of employees.42 Using a combination of
internet and mailed surveys, we collected 480 responses in the fall of 2013.
The survey asked attorneys responding what percentage of potential
clients with employment claims they agreed to represent. On average, the
attorneys accepted 15.8% of potential clients whose cases could proceed to
litigation. By contrast, they only accepted 8.1% of potential clients who
were covered by mandatory arbitration agreements. This finding supports
the above analysis, suggesting that it is less financially feasible for
attorneys to represent employees where there is a mandatory arbitration
agreement due to the reduced likely damage outcomes. It indicates that
rather than increasing accessibility, mandatory arbitration reduces the
ability of employees to bring cases because they are less likely to find
representation by attorneys.
These findings are concerning from an equality of access to justice
perspective. One of the strongest public policy arguments in favor of ADR
is that it may help reduce the barriers to access in the litigation system.
Employment attorneys find that these barriers in litigation prevent them
from taking many cases, due to the lack of provable damages that would
allow them to make and recover the necessary investment. However, our
results indicate that rather than increasing access, mandatory arbitration
makes it less likely that plaintiff attorneys will be able to accept a case
representing an employee. The reduced damages awarded and lower
prospects of success common to arbitration cases appear to overwhelm any
benefit from greater simplification of the procedures, with regard to
whether representation will be available. While ADR would ideally reduce
inequality in access to justice by allowing more employees to bring claims,
what we have found is that it increases inequality in access to justice by
reducing the effectiveness of the mechanism of representation by
employment attorneys.
42. See Gough, supra note 15, at 102-03.
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IV.
PATTERNS OF EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS
The processing and resolution of individual cases is only a part of the
role of employment litigation in employment relations. Enforcement of
employment laws has a broader purpose, and impacts the patterns of
employer behavior. For example, beyond providing retrospective justice to
a victim of discrimination in the workplace, an important purpose of
litigating a case is to deter future discriminatory conduct and encourage
fairer employment practices. The characteristics of the American system of
employment litigation described earlier are particularly suited to this
objective. Cases are often long and procedurally complex to bring, but, as
discussed, the prospect of relatively large damages provides a source of
bargaining power on the employee side and creates a strong incentive for
employers to take proactive measures to avoid the dangers of litigation.
How does mandatory arbitration affect the process through which
enforcement of employment law produces changes in patterns of
employment relations and management behavior in the workplace,
especially where mandatory arbitration reduces legal pressures on the
employer, as discussed earlier? Although there are no existing empirical
studies that directly test this issue, a recent study by Zev Eigen and Adam
Seth Litwin raises some interesting questions.4 3 Eigen and Litwin examined
the workplace justice perceptions of employees before and after the
adoption of an organizational dispute resolution procedure that included
mandatory arbitration. They found mixed effects. Employee perceptions of
procedural justice in the workplace decreased after the adoption of the
procedure.4 4 But, conversely, perceptions of informal, interpersonal justice
in the workplace increased after the adoption of the procedures.45 Eigen and
Litwin ascribe these different reactions to employees reacting positively to
individual manager efforts to handle problems at the workplace level, but
negatively to the centrally implemented formal procedure.
As with many employers, the organization studied here did not
introduce mandatory arbitration on its own, but rather as part of a system of
internal grievance procedures that included a number of preliminary steps
before arbitration.46 This makes the assessment of the effect of mandatory
arbitration itself more complex. A number of authors have written favorably
of the potential for internal grievance procedures to enhance fairness when
43. Zev Eigen & Adam Litwin, Justice or Just Between Us? Empirical Evidence of the Tradeoff
Between Procedural and Interactional Justice in Workplace Dispute Resolution, 67 INDUS. & LAB. REL.
REv. 171 (2014).
44. Id. at 171-72.
45. Id. at 192-93.
46. Id. at 181.
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they include steps that must be taken prior to arbitration itself.4 7 Some have
argued that the potential for these procedures to produce settlement of
meritorious claims prior to arbitration may account for lower employee
success rates in mandatory arbitration, because only weaker cases proceed
to arbitration.4
Some of my own research has examined the adoption and operation of
internal grievance procedures and their relationship to mandatory
arbitration. Many organizations that require mandatory arbitration of
employment disputes also have multi-step internal grievance procedures. In
an analysis of survey data of organizations in the telecommunications
industry, I found that mandatory arbitration as the final step of a non-union
grievance procedure was associated with higher usage by employees
compared to procedures with only managerial decision-makers.49 This
provides some evidence in support of what has been dubbed the appellate
effect, whereby internal procedures may be resolving cases before
arbitration, affecting the mixture of cases that ultimately reach arbitration in
the first place. However, there is no requirement that organizations adopt
any particular type of internal grievance procedures in conjunction with
mandatory arbitration. Indeed, an employer can simply require employees
to agree to arbitrate any potential legal claim without providing any type of
internal appeal procedure apart from arbitration. To the extent that
employers adopt mandatory arbitration without associated internal
procedures, this will reduce the size of an appellate effect on the types of
cases reaching mandatory arbitration.
It is also not obvious that the inclusion of mandatory arbitration is
needed to promote effective internal grievance procedures. An
organizational example is instructive here. One of the leading examples of a
company adopting a particularly extensive internal grievance procedure
including mandatory arbitration was the diversified auto parts and
aerospace firm TRW."o The company experienced an upsurge in
employment litigation following the downsizing of its aerospace division in
the early 1990s." In response to and inspired by the recent Gilmer holding,
it adopted mandatory arbitration for its employees beginning in 1994.52
However, in addition to adopting mandatory arbitration, it conducted a
47. E.g., DAVID B. LIPSKY, RONALD L. SEEBER & RICHARD FINCHER, EMERGING SYSTEMS FOR
MANAGING WORKPLACE CONFLICT (2003); Sherwyn et al., supra note 32.
48. Sherwyn et al., supra note 32.
49. Alexander J.S. Colvin, The Dual Transformation of Workplace Dispute Resolution, 42 INDUS.
REL. 712, 732 (2003).
50. The following description of TRW's procedure is based on the case study described in:
Alexander J.S. Colvin, Adoption and Use of Dispute Resolution Procedures in the Nonunion Workplace,
13 ADVANCES IN INDUS. & LAB. REL. 71 (2004).
51. Id
52. Id.
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more general overhaul of its existing internal grievance procedures to
ensure that all of its operating units had well-developed, effective
procedures. These procedures included more informal lower level
complaint procedures, peer review panels in some units, and mediation
using external third-party neutrals.s3
The result was a complex set of internal procedures that was used
frequently by employees to resolve many workplace disputes. The
enhancement of these internal procedures was certainly inspired in part by
the organizational review process directed at adopting mandatory
arbitration. Yet, in practice, this internal dispute resolution system operated
with very little involvement of its arbitration element. In the initial three
years of operation, only three out of seventy-two cases that reached the
mediation stage subsequently proceeded to arbitration.5 4 Furthermore, the
form of arbitration that TRW adopted was one in which the decision was
non-binding on the employee, allowing subsequent appeal to the courts. 55
TRW provides a good example of a particularly effective internal
grievance procedure. It retains arbitration in a form different from the
standard type of mandatory arbitration that bars access to the courts, and in
practice arbitration is rarely used to resolve cases. Well-designed internal
grievance procedures can be a useful element in extending due process
rights in the nonunion workplace, but the evidence from the best practices
examples in this area suggests that it is not necessary to implement
mandatory arbitration to have effective internal procedures.
More generally, one should not extrapolate too far from the types of
best practice examples, examples for which it is often easier to gather data.
In addition to examples like TRW and other companies that have included
due process protections in arbitration and implemented well-developed
internal grievance procedures," there are also organizations that allow for
substantial due process deficiencies in their arbitration procedures and lack
pre-arbitration steps involving mediation and/or internal grievance
procedures. As a general matter, we know much less about these
organizations because they are less willing to be studied. As a result, we
learn of their existence more often through cases challenging their
procedures, such as the notorious Hooters arbitration procedure, which was
held to be unenforceable due to its many due process deficiencies."
53. Id
54. Id. at 86.
55. Id
56. See, e.g., Sherwyn et al., supra note 32; Richard A. Bales & Jason N.W. Plowman,
Compulsory Arbitration as Part of a Broader Dispute Resolution Process: The Anheuser-Busch
Example, 26 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 1 (2008).
57. E.g., Hooters of Am., Inc. v. Phillips, 173 F.3d 933, 941 (4th Cir. 1999).
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The larger point is that there is wide variation in the practices and
procedures that companies adopt. It is the case that some companies do
adopt fair ADR procedures that should be encouraged. Others provide little
or nothing in the way of internal due process rights for their employees. The
problem with allowing the employer the discretion to decide whether or not
to adopt procedures, and in what form these procedures should be adopted,
is that it encourages variation in the quality of due process rights that
employees enjoy, and promotes inequality of access to justice in the
workplace. In practice, who an employee works for determines how that
employee's rights to fair treatment in employment are protected.
CONCLUSION
I began by posing the question of how mandatory arbitration affects
equality of access to justice in the workplace. Mandatory arbitration
changes the landscape of employment dispute resolution in a number of
important ways, including by altering the impact of employment laws. The
analysis I present addresses how mandatory arbitration affects four key
components of employment relations and individual rights in the
workplace.
First, mandatory arbitration changes the structure of rules by which
individual employment rights are enforced. The process of enforcing
individual rights in the workplace becomes subject to the employer's choice
of whether or not to adopt mandatory arbitration and of how any procedure
that is adopted is structured. Beyond producing inequality in whether
employees have access to the courts, the employer's decisions determine
the type of arbitration procedure that is adopted, whether an arbitration
service provider administers the procedure, the specific provider of the
arbitration procedure, and even whether employees are able to bring a class
action.
Second, mandatory arbitration changes the relative bargaining power
of employees attempting to enforce their individual rights. Whereas a key
feature of litigation is that it exposes the employer to the risk of potentially
large damage awards, mandatory arbitration reduces the degree to which the
employer is subject to this source of pressure. There are a number of
important procedural differences that may affect the mixture of cases
brought in arbitration versus litigation. But the overall picture in mandatory
arbitration is that the risk of employees receiving large damage awards
similar to those in litigation is substantially reduced.
Third, the smaller potential payoffs to employees disrupt the
mechanism of representation in employment cases. In employment
litigation, contingency fee arrangements allow a broader set of employees
to obtain representation by attorneys who finance the cases themselves.
Representation would be beyond the financial means of many individual
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employees if they had to pay standard hourly fees. In mandatory arbitration,
the lower economic damages reduce the potential payoffs from contingency
fee arrangements, creating a barrier to representation. We find evidence of
this in lower rates of acceptance of potential cases by attorneys under
mandatory arbitration.
Fourth, the adoption of mandatory arbitration has mixed effects on the
organization of internal conflict resolution procedures. Some employers do
choose to enhance their internal conflict resolution procedures alongside of
adopting mandatory arbitration. Many of these procedures provide avenues
for appeal that resolve significant numbers of potential cases without the
necessity of invoking arbitration. But there is also substantial variation in
whether employers adopting mandatory arbitration also use internal conflict
resolution procedures, as well as variation within the types of procedures
they adopt in the workplace.
Overall, the picture that emerges is one in which mandatory arbitration
disrupts existing mechanisms for enforcement of individual employment
rights. If arbitration provided a more effective and accessible mechanism of
enforcement, then this might be a trade-off worth making. However, the
evidence examined here suggests that it results in both wide variation in
how employment rights are protected among companies and significant
barriers to the effective bringing of claims against employers. The result is
that, rather than enhancing equality, mandatory arbitration exacerbates
inequality in access to justice in the workplace.
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